## §1. Original Statement

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559. I shall now show how the three conceptions of reference to a ground, reference to an object, and reference to an interpretant are the fundamental ones of at least one universal science, that of logic. Logic is said to treat of second intentions as applied to first.^{1)} It would lead me too far away from the matter in hand to discuss the truth of this statement; I shall simply adopt it as one which seems to me to afford a good definition of the subject-genus of this science. Now, second intentions are the objects of the understanding considered as representations, and the first intentions to which they apply are the objects of those representations. The objects of the understanding, considered as representations, are symbols, that is, signs which are at least potentially general. But the rules of logic hold good of any symbols, of those which are written or spoken as well as of those which are thought. They have no immediate application to likenesses or indices, because no arguments can be constructed of these alone, but do apply to all symbols. All symbols, indeed, are in one sense relative to the understanding, but only in the sense in which also all things are relative to the understanding. On this account, therefore, the relation to the understanding need not be expressed in the definition of the sphere of logic, since it determines no limitation of that sphere. But a distinction can be made between concepts which are supposed to have no existence except so far as they are actually present to the understanding, and external symbols which still retain their character of symbols so long as they are only **capable **of being understood. And as the rules of logic apply to these latter as much as to the former (and though only through the former, yet this character, since it belongs to all things, is no limitation), it follows that logic has for its subject-genus all symbols and not merely concepts.^{P1)} We come, therefore, to this, that logic treats of the reference of symbols in general to their objects. In this view it is one of a trivium of conceivable sciences. The first would treat of the formal conditions of symbols having meaning, that is of the reference of symbols in general to their grounds or imputed characters, and this might be called formal grammar;^{1)} the second, logic,^{2)} would treat of the formal conditions of the truth of symbols; and the third would treat of the formal conditions of the force of symbols, or their power of appealing to a mind, that is, of their reference in general to interpretants, and this might be called formal rhetoric.^{3)}

There would be a general division of symbols, common to all these sciences; namely, into,

1•. Symbols which directly determine only their **grounds **or imputed qualities, and are thus but sums of marks or **terms; **

2•. Symbols which also independently determine their **objects **by means of

other term or terms, and thus, expressing their own objective validity, become capable of truth or falsehood, that is, are **propositions; **and,

3•. Symbols which also independently determine their **interpretants, **and thus the minds to which they appeal, by premissing a proposition or propositions which such a mind is to admit. These are **arguments. **

And it is remarkable that, among all the definitions of the proposition, for example, as the **oratio indicativa, **as the subsumption of an object under a concept, as the expression of the relation of two concepts, and as the indication of the mutable ground of appearance, there is, perhaps, not one in which the conception of reference to an object or correlate is not the important one. In the same way, the conception of reference to an interpretant or third, is always prominent in the definitions of argument.

In a proposition, the term which separately indicates the object of the symbol is termed the subject, and that which indicates the ground is termed the predicate. The objects indicated by the subject (which are always potentially a plurality — at least, of phases or appearances) are therefore stated by the proposition to be related to one another on the ground of the character indicated by the predicate. Now this relation may be either a concurrence or an opposition. Propositions of concurrence are those which are usually considered in logic; but I have shown in a paper upon the classification of arguments ^{1)} that it is also necessary to consider separately propositions of opposition, if we are to take account of such arguments as the following:

Whatever is the half of anything is less than that of which it is the half:

A is half of B;

A is less than B.

The subject of such a proposition is separated into two terms, a »subject nominative« and an »object accusative.«

In an argument, the premisses form a representation of the conclusion, because they indicate the interpretant of the argument, or representation representing it to represent its object. The premisses may afford a likeness, index, or symbol of the conclusion. In deductive argument, the conclusion is represented by the premisses as by a general sign under which it is contained. In hypotheses, something **like **the conclusion is proved, that is, the premisses form a likeness of the conclusion. Take, for example, the following argument:

M is, for instance, P^{I}, P^{II}, P^{III}, and P^{IV};

S is P^{I}, P^{II}, P^{III}, and P^{IV}:

.·. S is M.

Here the first premiss amounts to this, that »P^{I}, P^{II}, P^{III}, and P^{IV}« is a likeness of M, and thus the premisses are or represent a likeness of the conclusion. That it is different with induction another example will show.

S^{I}, S^{II}, S^{III}, and S^{IV} are taken as samples of the collection M;

S^{I}, S^{II}, S^{III}, and S^{IV} are P:

.·. All M is P.

Hence the first premiss amounts to saying that »S^{I}, S^{II}, S^{III}, and S^{IV}« is an index of M. Hence the premisses are an index of the conclusion.

The other divisions of terms, propositions, and arguments arise from the distinction of extension and comprehension. I propose to treat this subject in a subsequent paper.^{1)} But I will so far anticipate that as to say that there is, first, the direct reference of a symbol to its objects, or its denotation; second, the reference of the symbol to its ground, through its object, that is, its reference to the common characters of its objects, or its connotation; and third, its reference to its interpretants through its object, that is, its reference to all the synthetical propositions in which its objects in common are subject or predicate, and this I term the information it embodies. And as every addition to what it denotes, or to what it connotes, is effected by means of a distinct proposition of this kind, it follows that the extension and comprehension of a term are in an inverse relation, as long as the information remains the same, and that every increase of information is accompanied by an increase of one or other of these two quantities. It may be observed that extension and comprehension are very often taken in other senses in which this last proposition is not true.

This is an imperfect view of the application which the conceptions which, according to our analysis, are the most fundamental ones find in the sphere of logic. It is believed, however, that it is sufficient to show that at least something may be usefully suggested by considering this science in this light.

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